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I. Introduction 
What follows is an argument that can be used to justify the introduction of philosophical, and 
specifically ethical, discourse into a wide range of university courses.2 
The argument advanced is, we hope, both sufficiently formal to convince administrators, and 
sufficiently broad to convince students, of the practical importance that at least one area of philosophy 
has for the successful pursuit of even the most praxis-oriented career.3 
In particular, we will argue that the economic concept of a merit good provides a convenient platform 
for introducing ethical discourse throughout those areas of the college curriculum where economic 
concepts play a pivotal role. 
Moreover, the concept of a merit good can serve as a ready vehicle for introducing an ethical 
dimension into the formation of future leaders in business and politics. We will say more about merit 
goods and how these objectives might be accomplished in a moment. But we should like to mention 
that one considerable advantage of the “merit good” approach is that students come to recognize that 
it is impossible to avoid ethical considerations in their future careers. Economic activity simply cannot 
be properly understood apart from its ethical dimension. Hence, if students wish to gain a true and 
accurate understanding of their future field of employment—if, in fact, they wish to excel at what they 
do—then an education in ethics is not only appropriate but, most likely, practically necessary. 
So, what we hope to do here is to offer a suggestion, open to further articulation and revision, that we 
believe has some interesting implications both for the general project of justifying the teaching of 
ethics across the curriculum, and for how, in a concrete way, the introduction of ethical discourse can 
be accomplished in a manner attractive to students, teachers, and administrators. A syllabus for a 
course which makes strategic use of the “merit good” concept is given in the appendix to this paper. 
The course has been taught for several years by one of the authors and has been particularly well 
received by students majoring in government. 
Our basic argument can be stated as follows: There exists, within economic theory, a class of 
economic goods, namely, “merit goods,” that are of at least equal theoretical and practical importance 
to “private goods” and “public goods.” What is philosophically interesting about merit goods is that, 
as a precondition of their existence, and embedded within their very definition, merit goods make 
reference to and depend upon normative disciplines like ethics. Insofar as understanding and 
accounting for merit goods is important to economics, and insofar as economics is itself important to 
other fields of study, the economic notion of a merit good can be used to underwrite an introduction of 
ethical discourse across a wide spectrum of university courses. Moreover, the particular constellation 
of courses within which mention of merit goods naturally arises happens to overlap significantly with 
the types of courses praxis-oriented future leaders are likely to take. Given the appropriate 
instructional context, future leaders will no longer perceive ethical reflection as an alien intrusion but, 
rather, as an organic development that makes contact with and flourishes within the subject they are 
studying. As we discuss below, a more effective allocation of social goods is achieved by engagement 
at the specifically ethical level with the target audience of the social policy. The formal study of ethics 
is thus introduced, in a natural and systematic way, into the formation of future leaders, be they 
economists, economic advisors, public policy planners, or politicians. 
 
II. What is a merit good? 
The concept of a “merit good” was formally introduced by Richard Musgrave in 1956 to account for 
certain conceptual orphans in his theory of public finance.4 Musgrave recognized that there are several 
economic goods which, while they are part of the public budget, are not justifiable by a public goods 
argument. In other words, goods such as subsidized housing for the poor, obligatory public education, 
and mandatory public inoculations cannot be justified by claiming that these economic goods are (i) 
supplied to the people who want them, (ii) in the degree to which they are wanted, and that (iii) the 
burden of payment is born by those who benefit from the goods (iv) in proportion to the benefit they 
receive. Consumer sovereignty is clearly violated in such cases: consumers are coerced into accepting 
more inoculations (for instance) than they would prefer. Yet, despite the failure of a public goods 
argument, it would be strange indeed to think that there can be no justification for such laudable items 
within the public budget.5 It would also be odd to think that the science of economics should not 
attempt to both describe and theoretically grapple with such patently economic phenomena. 
Enter the concept of a merit good. Formally stated, a “merit good” is an economic good with respect 
to which competent authorities may, legitimately, and for axiological reasons, intervene in markets in 
a manner contrary to consumer preferences.6 Such interventions are usually (though not always) 
intended to bring about a change in consumer preference. The intention to change consumer 
preference is itself prompted by a prior critique of actual consumer demand, the level of prevailing 
demand being judged by competent authorities to be inappropriate in some way. 
An obvious example of this class of economic goods is what one might actually wish to call a 
“demerit” good, namely, cigarettes. Some competent medical and political authority—say the 
Surgeon General—judges that the current consumer demand for cigarettes is too high. In response to 
that judgment, we find that high taxes are imposed on cigarettes, that venues for the advertisement of 
cigarettes are limited, that smoking in public buildings is curtailed, and that labels with severe health 
warnings are required on the product.7 Over time, it is hoped that a new pattern of consumer demand 
for cigarettes will emerge, a pattern of demand that is more in keeping with the lowered demand 
patterns envisioned by the intervening authorities. 
Let us now situate merit goods in relation to the two other basic types of economic goods. We begin 
by dividing all economic goods into private goods and non-private goods. By “private good” we 
understand an economic good that is optimally provided via the free market mechanism. Private 
goods typically involve rivalry and exclusivity in consumption. For instance, if a person eats an apple 
then the benefit of eating that apple accrues exclusively to that person and cannot be shared with 
anyone else. 
Non-private goods, on the other hand, are economic goods that are not optimally provided via the free 
market mechanism. Non-private goods come in two types, public goods and merit goods. The 
distinction between the two types of non-private goods turns upon the reason why the free market 
fails to provide those goods at optimal levels. A “public good” is a non-private good that is supplied, 
typically by the government but sometimes by other organized groups, with the intention of respecting 
consumer preferences. Consumers need help in procuring such goods because of some technical or 
formal feature of the good that makes it either difficult or impossible for individuals to acquire the 
good by themselves in an optimal way. Typical reasons for market failure in the case of public goods 
are their non-rivalness in consumption and their non-excludability. For instance, clean air to breathe 
will not be lessened by several people enjoying it nor can we prevent people from enjoying clean air, 
even if they do not pay. 
Merit goods are also non-private goods and, as we’ve already mentioned, merit goods are also 
instances of some kind of market failure. However, the reason for the free market mechanism failing 
in the case of merit goods is not technical in nature but axiological. The value consumers place on 
merit goods is inappropriate: in a free market consumers either desire too much of a bad thing (as in 
the case of cigarettes) or too little of a good thing (hence, compulsory public education). It is at least 
arguable that consumers ought to value things differently than they do, and so some intervention by 
competent authorities is justifiable. 
Such, then, must suffice for a formal characterization of merit goods. For present purposes it is neither 
necessary nor prudent to fill in too much detail. Formal research into the nature and the behavior of 
merit goods is still relatively new, and much important work remains to be done. At this time we 
would, however, like to highlight the following salient features of merit goods. 
First, and most importantly, as a matter of brute empirical fact, merit goods do exist.8 Some of our 
most treasured public institutions and social programs display merit good aspects, mandatory public 
education, subsidized housing, and sumptuary taxes on cigarettes being clear instances. 
Second, the phenomena picked out by the “merit good” concept are clearly economic in nature, and as 
such it is necessary for the science of economics to provide an account of them. Economics would be 
incomplete, and economists would be shirking their duty, if merit goods escaped their purview. It is 
entirely appropriate for us to expect a distinctively economic account of merit goods to be 
forthcoming. 
Third, the existence of merit goods logically depends upon a prior, normative critique of consumer 
demand. Optimal provision of merit goods is emphatically not achieved by satisfying existing 
consumer demand. Rather, optimal provision of any merit good requires active intervention contrary 
to prevailing consumer demand. But to do so by using the power of the government requires ethical 
justification. 
This third point is worth dwelling upon. Note that what the optimal levels of merit goods are, and 
which specific economic goods are best interpreted as merit goods, are issues that cannot be settled 
from within the discipline of economics itself as it has traditionally been conceived. By this we mean 
that economics, at least in the form in which it is generally understood, is conceived of as the science 
which maximally satisfies the allocation of scarce resources in accordance with pre-given consumer 
preferences. Normativity extends only thus far in traditional economic thought. But the point of 
identifying a particular economic good as a merit good is that the pre-given consumer preferences 
themselves are in need of criticism. Thus—and this is a crucial point—a properly economic 
understanding of merit goods must make reference to disciplines outside the bounds of economic 
science as traditionally conceived. Economics cannot help but be socio-economics. And, since 
optimal consumption levels are revealed only through a normative critique of what should be the case, 
of what ought to be done, it follows that the particular discipline socio-economics must look to for its 
illumination is ethics. In short, economic thinking is inevitably intertwined with ethics, the science of 
what human beings ought to do. Therefore, with the introduction of merit goods, ethical discourse 
assumes a natural, and perfectly proper, place within economics courses.9 
 
III. Applications of the merit good concept 
At the outset of this paper we claimed that the economic concept of a merit good can be used to 
legitimate the discussion of ethics within a variety of educational contexts. We would now like to 
develop that program. We will begin with a few remarks on how ethical discourse might arise within 
the teaching of economics courses, and then will expand the range of application of the merit good 
concept to other aspects of the curriculum. 
Let us begin with an examination of the teaching of economics at the undergraduate level. 
As economics is generally taught at the introductory level, students are treated to a brief conceptual 
survey wherein they are made acquainted with the fundamental distinction between private goods and 
public goods, and then the instructor moves quickly on to a formal or mathematical treatment of these 
two goods. Yet, as we have noted, the division of economic goods into public goods and private is 
hardly exhaustive: the division overlooks a wide range of economic phenomena that is captured only 
through the introduction of the concept of a merit good. Of course, no introductory course aims at a 
complete treatment of its subject: details are filled in only after further academic specialization; but 
the variety and importance of merit good phenomena cry out for acknowledgement (if not full 
exposition) at the introductory level. A systematic and satisfying introduction to economics as a 
science requires, we believe, some discussion of merit goods. While the technical treatment of merit 
goods is still, after several years, in its nascence, achieving an adequate theoretical grasp of any 
particular economic good that is de facto treated (at least by the intervening authorities) as a merit 
good will require mention of the prior normative thinking that prompted the intervention economists 
now find themselves obliged to describe. To appreciate just how wide the de facto net of merit goods 
can be cast, consider that any economic good can be treated as a merit good (or, more precisely, as a 
demerit good). This potential is implicit in the government’s ability to place a sumptuary tax on any 
economic good it wishes.10 Since merit good interventions must appeal to normative standards for 
their justification, it follows that some knowledge of ethical theory and ethical practice can illuminate 
a wide spectrum of economic activity. The government’s power to tax is a clear example, since taxes 
require justification. Moreover, without an understanding of ethics, such phenomena as mandatory 
inoculations, property taxes to support public schools, and sumptuary taxes on cigarettes would 
remain economically unintelligible: there would be some un-analyzed remainder whose import the 
integrated understanding of the economist would fail to grasp. Why, for instance, do we not pay 
cigarette smokers to quit but instead penalize smokers for smoking? Both solutions are equally 
possible, and equally plausible, under a cost/benefit analysis. Since the utility implicit within both 
scenarios is equal, to consistently decide in one way rather than another can only be justified by 
reference to a theory of what should be done over and above what can be done.11 
Let us assume that our basic point, namely, that ethical discourse may legitimately appear within 
economics courses, has been sufficiently established. We would now like to consider how the merit 
good concept may be applied in other disciplines. 
The point we would like to make in this regard is fairly straightforward. Other disciplines can be 
shown to benefit from the study of ethics in proportion to the importance that a grasp of economic 
facts has for that particular discipline. Not that there are lacking any number of alternative 
justifications for injecting ethics into, say, a class on public policy. Rather, we argue that the 
importance of possessing a reasonably nuanced understanding of economics for a public policy 
practitioner is sufficient justification for introducing ethical discourse into a course on public policy. 
This may be the place to expound a bit on the conceptual link, or the general relation that obtains 
between economics and public policy. Not only do policy makers hold themselves in some measure 
accountable for economic performance (they certainly take the credit for good times and don’t 
hesitate to point a finger during bad ones), but policy makers consistently try to influence society 
through economic means. Certainly in the formulation of almost any public policy the question of 
economics arises. Leaders in the formulation of public policy are often those who are responsible for 
identifying areas where levels of consumer demand are currently at unacceptable levels. In brief, 
public policy wonks are professionally responsible for identifying merit goods. 
Public policy leaders are also tasked with implementing market interventions, and here a theoretical 
grasp of the axiological pre-conditions for merit goods can be useful. For instance, and we apologize 
for the controversial nature of the example, it has been demonstrated by R.K. Godwin that treating 
family planning supplies as having a merit good aspect leads to a more efficient allocation of social 
resources in less developed nations.12 As Godwin notes, between 1963 and 1977 the governing elites 
of sixty-two less developed nations set the goal of reducing the birth rates in their respective 
countries. In each case, the impulse to have smaller families came from above, not from below, from 
the governing elites, not from the governed masses. The public policy of reducing fertility rates is thus 
an example of an intervention contrary to prevailing market preferences. To develop programs that 
would effectively change the then-prevailing desire for larger families, it proved important to 
acknowledge both the ethical reasoning that went into the intervention sponsored by the governing 
elites as well as the ethical milieu of the governed masses whose desire for larger families was the 
target of the intervention. Godwin demonstrates that taking a mixed approach, wherein the provision 
of family planning materials is treated as simultaneously possessing private, public, and merit good 
aspects, leads to the most efficient allocation of social resources. For the student of public policy, 
there are clear practical advantages to explicitly acknowledging and understanding merit goods. 
Again, understanding the normative considerations behind merit goods can serve as a useful brake on 
unwarranted government interventions. Policy makers do well to remember that any merit good 
intervention they initiate entails that they are out of step with the public perceptions of their 
constituency. Ethical reflection naturally arises at this point, both with regard to initial policy 
formation and with regard to public vindication of individual policies. Policy makers must be able to 
discern what should be done, must be able to justify their understanding and pursuit of what should be 
done, and must be able to predict how their proposed interventions will be received given the 
prevailing morals and mores of the target group of the interventions. As V. Santhakumar has shown 
(in an interesting study of water provision in the Indian state of Kerala), there are social costs 
associated with public officials mis-identifying merit goods.13 
We have argued that introducing the notion of a merit good, and the ethical discourse concomitant 
with the introduction of that concept, into public policy courses is both justifiable and desirable. 
Future leaders of public policy are likely to welcome the introduction of ethical discourse into their 
discipline, for pragmatic reasons related to public effectiveness, if for no other reason. 
We would now like to mention just one more area of the curriculum where introducing the concept of 
a merit good would be appropriate: business courses. Any professional, including business leaders, 
whose field of activity is significantly affected by economics should take ethics into account in order 
to be more effective. For instance, future business leaders will quickly discover that which particular 
goods and services they may provide, as well as how those goods and services can be distributed, are 
affected by axiological considerations. The days of J.S. Mill defending the opium trade are long gone: 
the noble principles of free trade can hardly justify an Opium War once opium has been classified as a 
demerit good of the most extreme variety.14 
Ethical awareness can also be of use to business leaders when they are confronted with concrete 
difficulties related to product development and product placement, and can also aid their interaction 
with regulatory agencies. To cite a personal example: one of the odd things about living in 
Washington, D.C., is that one sees advertisements for things that one would never see advertised 
anywhere else. So, for instance, as of late 2003, if one had walked into various Metro stations in the 
city one would have encountered large posters advertising LockheedMartin’s F-22 Raptor. There were 
also numerous ads for the plane on the radio (e.g., on WGMS, the classical station). Now, the F-22 is 
not the sort of plane one uses for casual business travel. What the advertisers were clearly trying to do 
was sell the F-22 to public officials by positioning their product as a merit good. Lockheed-Martin 
worked hard to convince Congress that the Raptor should be adopted by the U.S. military. And, while 
we are sure that the demand for the F-22 was below what Lockheed-Martin would have liked it to be, 
we would also be surprised to discover that the advertising blitz wasn’t at least partially successful. 
Such is the life of a government defense contractor: gaining the private good of company profits 
through the sale of (putative) merit goods. 
There are several other disciplines, for example, anthropology and history, within which an ethical 
dimension may legitimately be introduced via the mechanism of economic merit goods. For instance, 
the merit good concept can be used to express, in more precise theoretical terms, the “total system of 
giving” described by Marcel Mauss in his Essai sur le don. This is because the explicitly economic 
goods Mauss discusses are fully integrated into social gifting systems that are supposed to embody 
principles of distributive justice. With respect to the study of history, merit goods are conceptually 
useful when interpreting public budgets, as witness Adam Smith’s remarks concerning the different 
financing methods appropriate for different types of public works.15 Or, to take another example, it is 
only in the light of their complex social evaluations of economic rights and duties, i.e., of economic 
merits and demerits, that the bewildering medieval English laws concerning the gathering of firewood 
can be understood.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
We have presented the notion of a merit good and have argued for the appropriateness of expanding 
ethical discourse into economics courses. This is, already, something of a gain. But, once introduced 
into economics courses, the discussion of ethics occasioned by merit goods spreads beyond the 
borders of economics. A wide range of praxis-based courses, including the public policy and business 
courses, are natural extensions. And with the systematic and justifiable introduction of the concept of 
a merit good comes the equally justifiable introduction of ethics across wide areas of the typical 
college curriculum and the exposure of university students to the peculiar pleasures of philosophical 
reflection. 
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the grounds that economists have already rendered the problematic notion of a merit good conceptually 
superfluous by introducing the better-behaved notion of an economic “externality.” We don’t think that 
Smith can escape in this way. Here is one way that the argument might go. Suppose we point to some 
specific instance of a market failure and then claim that that market failure should be labeled as a merit good. 
Smith will then object, claiming that the market failure in question is due to some externality. To begin with, 
since Smith refuses to admit merit goods into economic theory, we will assume that Smith believes that all 
economic goods are exhaustively categorized as either public goods or private goods. (This is a simplifying 
assumption, as various economists have proposed more robust classificatory schemes. The following 
argument can, mutatis mutandis, cover such theoretical extensions.) Now, since Smith claims that 
externalities can be adequately handled from within standard economic theory, it seems that the particular 
externality in question must itself be some sort of economic good. However, the externality cannot be a 
private good; otherwise, there would be no market failure for us to point to in the first place. Therefore, the 
externality must be a public good. This means that Smith implicitly holds the position that what we would 
label merit goods should be reduced to public goods. But, as it turns out, merit goods cannot be reduced to 
public goods. For, if merit goods are reducible to public goods, then it is either the case that our market 
failure is due to a failure of will or it is the case that our market failure is due to a failure of knowledge. 
Smith cannot admit that the market failure is due to a failure of will. This is because criticizing an agent’s 
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(i.e., the agent is morally misdirected) or what the agent should do but doesn’t (i.e., we have an akratic 
agent). This is exactly the sort of normative critique that the proposed definition of merit goods recognizes. 
Nor, for that matter, can Smith admit that the market failure in question is due to a failure of knowledge. For 
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additional knowledge is itself either a private good or a public good. The required additional knowledge 
cannot be a public good, for that would make Smith’s argument viciously circular: market failures occur 
because there are (explanatorily prior) failures in knowledge, and failures in knowledge occur because there 
are (explanatorily prior) market failures. Nor can the required additional knowledge be a private good, for 
the relevant additional knowledge clearly is not being desired or supplied by the free market mechanism at a 
level Smith finds acceptable. Since the additional knowledge that one ought to have can be neither a public 
good nor a private good, should Smith still wish to claim that economic agents ought to possess some 
additional knowledge, then this ought is to be interpreted in a normative sense. But Smith’s advancing a 
normative critique—a critique, let it be noted, endogenous to the science of economics—of the distribution 
of knowledge in the market would then entail that Smith is treating knowledge as a merit good. Smith’s 
doing so would in turn imply that Smith admits the legitimacy of the merit good concept in economics—
which is what we set to prove. 
9.  As one anonymous reviewer quite correctly points out, acknowledging the normative dimensions of a 
concept is not sufficient for engaging in philosophical ethics. The extent to which consideration of merit 
goods and ethical issues arises within any particular course is, naturally, a function of the aims of the 
instructor. Within an introductory economics course it may well be that discussion of various merit goods 
and their ethical implications would be fairly minimal. On the other hand, in more advanced courses in 
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people simply should not have to put up with the sorts of polluted product then being marketed. 
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prohibition of the importation of opium into China; the restriction of the sale of poisons; all cases, in short, 
where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. 
These interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on 
that of the buyer.” 
15. For evidence that Adam Smith operates with a concept that de facto distinguishes between public goods and 
merit goods see Wilfried Ver Eecke, “Adam Smith and Musgrave’s Concept of Merit Good,” Journal of 
Socio-Economics 27 (1998): 133-53. 
 
Appendix 
Ethics and Economics: Efficiency & Justice 
Professor Ver Eecke 
Phil 377/527; Econ 252 
Classes: TR: 1:15-2:30PM 
Office: NN 227. Tel 687-7613. 
E-mail: Vereeckw@Georgetown.edu 
Office Hours: M 2:30-4:30PM and by appointment 
The purpose of the course is to show the systematic connection between the different disciplines analysing 
economic reality. Different discourses about the economy concentrate more on one concept than the other. 
Thus, economic discourse concentrates more on efficiency whereas philosophy and theology concentrate 
more on justice. I will try to show that one needs to pay attention to both concepts in all discourses. The 
main thesis is that even in an economic discourse the idea of justice emerges as inherently tied to the concept 
of efficiency. 
Many articles for the class can be found in two books: 
Ver Eecke, W., An Anthology Regarding Merit Goods: The Unfinished Ethical Revolution in Economic Theory 
[edited and commentary by Wilfried Ver Eecke]. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007. 
Ver Eecke, W. (2008). Ethical Dimension of Economics: Making Use of Hegel and the Concepts of Public and 
Merit Goods. Springer Verlag, 2008. 
These will be referred to below as Ver Eecke, 2007 and Ver Eecke, 2008 respectively. For Ver Eecke, 2007 one 
can find an easily accessible review on Amazon.com: http://www.amazon. com/gp/product/customer-
reviews/1557534284/ref=cm_cr_dp_all_top/002-8358327-
6991234?ie=UTF8&n=283155&s=books#customerReviews  
 
I. Introduction: Course Overview and Clarification of Approach 
W. Ver Eecke, “Authority in Economics” 
Economic Justice for All. Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (U.S. Catholic 
Bishops, 1986). Chapters 1; 2; 3,A-B; 4. Also available at: www.osjspm.org/economic_justice_for_all.aspx 
Ver Eecke, 2008, Ch. 10. 
W. Ver Eecke, “Ethics in Economics: From Classical Economics to Neo-liberalism,” Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, 9, 145-68. 
Ver Eecke, 2008, Ch. 4. 
Bator, Francis M., “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization,” American Economic Review (March 
1957), pp. 22-31. 
Recommended reading: 
Mises, Ludwig von, “Economic Calculation and the Socialist Commonwealth,” Collective Economic Planning, 
F.A. 
Hayek, ed. (Clifton: A.M. Kelly, 1975) pp. 95-110. 
Al Hamad, A.Y. (2003). The Arab World: Performance and Prospects. In The Per Jacobson Lecture. Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates Washington, D.C. The Per Jacobson Foundation (2003) pp. 5 17. 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 576-598. 
 
II. Imperfections in the Market 
A. Market corrections: Public goods 
Wildavsky, Aaron, “Why the Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Should be Abandoned,” 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3 (4) (1991): 355-378. 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 84-113. 
W. Ver Eecke. “Public Goods: An Ideal Concept,” Journal of Socio-Economics, 28(3), 39–156. 
Ver Eecke, 2008, Ch. 6. 
Recommended reading: 
Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action. 2nd ed. (Harvard University Press, 1971) pp.1-16; 132-135; 
165-67. 
 
B. Market failures and merit goods 
a. Musgrave’s introduction of the concept and his many definitions of it. 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 19-70. 
 
b. The commentators of Musgrave’s concept of merit good: 
McLure, Charles E., Jr., “Merit Wants: A Normatively Empty Box,” Finanzarchiv 27 (1968), pp. 474-483. 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 73-83. 
Mackscheidt, Klaus. “Meritorische Güter: Musgraves Idee und Deren Konsequenzen.” WISU Das 
Wirtschaftsstudium 3 (1974): 237-41. (Translated). Cf: Ver Eecke, 2007, 244-252. 
Folkers, Cay. “Meritorische Güter Als Problem der Normativen Theorie Öffentliche Ausgaben,” Jahrbuch Für 
Sozialwissenschaft 25 (1974): 1-29. (Translated). 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 253-280. 
Brennan, Geofrey, and Loren Lomasky. “Institutional Aspects of ‘Merit Goods’ Analysis,” Finanzarchiv 41 
(1983): 183-206. 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 295-319. 
Paul Burrows, “’Efficient’ Pricing and Government Interference,” in Michael Posner (ed.), Public Expenditure: 
Allocation between Competing Ends (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 81-93. 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 281-294. 
Ver Eecke. “The Concept of Merit Good.” Journal of Socio-Economics, 27 (1): 133-53. 
Ver Eecke, 2008, Ch. 5. 
Recommended reading: 
Wildavsky, Aaron, “Opportunity Costs and Merit Wants,” Ch. 7 of Speaking Truth to Power. (Boston: Little, 
Brown). 
 
III. Philosophy and Political Economy 
Rawls, John, “Justice as Fairness,” The Philosophical Review, 47 (April 1958), pp. 164-194. 
Sen, A.K., “More than 100 Million Women are Missing,” New 
York Review of Books, Dec. 20, 1990, 61-66. 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 495-507. 
Sen, A.K. “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 1977, pp. 317-344. 
Ver Eecke, W. “Hegel on Economics and Freedom.” Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie, 69 (2), 189-215. 
Ver Eecke, 2008, Ch. 3 
Buchanan, James. “Fairness, Hope and Justice” in Roger Skurski, ed., New Directions in Economic Justice 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 474-494. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Whither Reform? Towards a New Agenda for Latin America.” Prebisch Lecture delivered at 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago, Chile, on 26 August 2002. 
Baier, A. “The Need for More Than Justice” in Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Harvard University Press, 
1994), pp. 18-32. 
Ver Eecke, 2007, 657-673. 
Recommended reading: 
Journal Issue devoted to the work of SEN: Economics and Philosophy, 2001, vol. 17. 
Cristi, F.R., “Hegel and Roman Liberalism” in History of Political Thought 5 (1984) pp. 281-94. 
Nussbaum, M. “Justice for Women” The New York Review of Books vol. 39, no. 16, pp. 43-48. 
Sen, A.K. “Moral Standing of the Market,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 1985, pp. 1-19. 
Rawls, John, “Concepts of Distributional Equality: Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion” American 
Economic Review (May 1974), pp. 141-146. 
Sen, A.K. “Personal Utilities and Public Judgments or What’s Wrong with Welfare Economics,” The Economic 
Journal, 89 (September 1979), pp. 537-558. 
 
IV. Institutions, Culture, and Religion 
A. Ethos pattern, political organization and political choice. 
Briefs, Goetz A., “The Ethos Problem in the Present Pluralistic Society,” Review of Social Economy (Dec. 
1983), pp. 271-299. 
Ver Eecke, Wilfried. “A Refundable Tax Credit for Children: 
Self-interest-based and Morally Based Arguments.” Journal of Socio-Economics, 25 (3), 383-394. 
Ver Eecke, 2008, Ch. 8. 
To be read or to be summarized depending on time: 
Olson, Mancur, Jr., “The Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates” in D.C. Mueller, ed., The Political 
Economy of Growth (Yale University Press, 1983) pp. 7-52. 
Glendon, Mary Ann, “Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions,” The University of Chicago Law Review 59:1 
(Winter 1992) pp. 519-38. 
Recommended reading: 
Briefs, G.A., “Marginal Ethics in the Pluralistic Society,” Review of Social Economy (December 1983) pp. 259-
270. 
Buchanan, J.M., “Public Finance and Public Choice,” National Tax Journal, 1975, pp. 383-394. 
Hirschman, A.O. “Where the Montesquieu-Stewart Vision Went Wrong,” in his The Passions and the Interests: 
Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 117-128. 
Bane, Jo Mary and David T. Ellwood. “Is American Business Working for the Poor?” Harvard Business Review 
(September-October) 1991, pp. 2-8. 
B. Religious ethics and economics 
a. The interaction of economics, politics, philosophy and religion according to John Paul II  
John Paul II. Centesimus Annus. 
Recommended reading: 
Essays on Centesimus Annus, National Review, Special Supplement, 1991. 
W. Ver Eecke. “The Economy and Values,” in: Absolute Values and the Search for the Peace of Mankind Vol. 
I. (New York, The Intercultural Foundation Press, 1981) pp. 123-140. 
Ver Eecke, 2008, Ch. 1. Byers, David M. Justice in the Market Place (Washington, DC.: USCC, 1985). 
Weigel, George, ed., A New Worldly Order: John Paul II on Human Freedom: A ‘Centesimus Annus’ Reader 
(Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1992). 
b. Comment on Economic Justice for All 
W. Ver Eecke, “American Capitalism: A Philosophical Reflection,” Philosophy and Theology, 3 (2), 105-32. 
Ver Eecke, 2008, Ch. 7. 
Recommended reading: 
Hollenbach, C., S.J., Claims in Conflict (Woodstock Theological Center, 1979) pp. 99-121. 
& 
B. Douglass, ed., The Deeper Meaning of Economic Life (Georgetown University Press, 1987): 
(1) B. Douglass, “First Things First: The Letter and the Common Good Tradition,” pp. 21-36. 
(2) J. Langan, S.J. “The American Context of the Bishops’ Letter,” pp. 1-20. 
(3) H. Briefs, “The Limits of Scripture: Theological Imperatives and the Economic Reality,” pp. 97- 
117. 
c. David Hollenbach on next steps in Catholic social ethics 
D. Hollenbach, “Justice as Participation: Public Moral Discourse and the U.S. Economy,” in his Justice, Peace, 
and Human Rights (New York: Crossroads, 1988). 
d. Other Christian Perspectives on Economic Justice Requirements in the modern world. 
J. Philip Wogaman, 1986, Economics and Ethics: A Christian Inquiry (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), Ch. 
1. 
e. Justice in other religions. 
Seymour Siegel. “A Jewish View of Economic Justice,” in Contemporary Jewish Ethics and Morality, E.N. 
Dorff & L.E. Newman, eds. (Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 336-43. 
 
Schedule 
Sept 2: Introduction and overview. 
Sept 7: W. Ver Eecke, “Authority in economics” 
Sept 9: Economic Justice for All. 
Sept 14: W. Ver Eecke, “The Economic Order: A Human, Not a Natural Institution” 
Sept 16: Bator, Francis M., “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization” 
Sept 21: Wildavsky, Aaron, “Why the Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Should Be 
Abandoned” 
Sept 23: W. Ver Eecke, “Objecting to a Libertarian Attack” 
Sept 28: Musgrave’s introduction of the concept merit good 
Sept 30: Musgrave’s many definitions and justifications 
Oct 5: Musgrave’s many definitions and justifications 
Oct 7: McLure, “Merit Wants: A Normatively Empty Box” Mackscheidt, Klaus. “Meritorische Güter: 
Musgraves Idee und Deren Konsequenzen.” (Translated) 
Oct 12: Folkers, Cay, “Meritorische Güter Als Problem der Normativen Theorie Öffentliche Ausgaben.” 
(Translated) 
Oct 14: Brennan, Geoffrey, and Loren Lomasky, “Institutional Aspects of ‘Merit Goods’ Analysis” 
Oct 19: Burrows, “Efficient Pricing and Government Interference” 
Oct 21: Ver Eecke, “Concept of Merit Good” 
Oct 26: Rawls, John, “Justice as Fairness” 
Oct 28: Baier., A., “The Need for more than Justice” 
Nov 2: Sen, A.K., “More Than 100 Million Women are Missing” 
Nov 4: Sen, A.K., “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory” 
Nov 9: Ver Eecke, W., “Ethical Function of the Economy” (on Hegel) 
Nov 11: Buchanan, James, “Fairness, Hope and Justice” 
Nov 16: Stiglitz, “Whither Reform?” 
Nov 18: Briefs, “The Ethos Problem in the Present Pluralistic Society” 
Nov 23: Summary of: Olson, M., “The Political Economy of Comparative Growth” 
 Glendon, M.A., “Rights in the Twentieth-Century Constitutions.” 
 Discussion of: Ver Eecke. “Unjust redistribution in the American system” 
Nov 30: John Paul II, Centesimus Annus 
Dec 2: W. Ver Eecke, “Structural Deficiencies in the American System” 
Dec 7: Wogaman, Economics and Ethics: A Christian Inquiry 
Siegel, Seymour, “A Jewish View of Economic Justice” 
 
Mechanics of the course: 
1.  The course will be conducted as a seminar. Sometimes I will summarize the content of the readings. 
Sometimes questions will be distributed to be discussed in groups and to be reported back to the class. Most 
of the time, a student will be assigned to present the reading material. At all times the whole class is 
expected to be prepared for discussing the material, unless an explicit exception is made. Questions dealing 
with problems of understanding the material will be dealt with first. Afterwards questions about the validity 
of the arguments will be addressed. 
2.  After each section, all students are expected to show their understanding of the material by writing a 4 page 
(double spaced) paper answering one or more questions about that section. The paper is to be handed in one 
week after the end of the section. A rewrite is possible for the first paper. For all students, one paper may be 
replaced by a summary of a topic related to the chapter but not covered in class, e.g., ideas from the 
recommended reading. Such an option needs to be approved by the teacher. 
Graduate or professional students need to present at the end of the course a final paper of 10-15 pages. You 
may relate some topics covered in the course to your own research area or you may summarize ideas of 
important authors and relate them to topics treated in the course (Brennan, Rawls, Buchanan, Sen, de Soto, 
Krugman, Stiglitz) or you may address important issues such as globalization, poverty, the role of 
international institutions, wealth distribution making use of the ideas discussed in the class. You need to 
have approval for the topic of your research paper. For graduate and professional students, the research paper 
counts for half of the points determining the grade. 
3.  Class participation and class presentation may count towards the grade. Class absence for a valid reason 
needs to be explained to the professor. 
4.  No final exam. 
 
 
